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I. Background
Recently, Thomas Andrew Simonds, S.J., wrote an article addressing the
status of embryonic human life. I In it he proposes the possibility of dividing early
embryonic life into three stages. He holds this division to reflect contemporary
language more accurately, since these three stages incorporate "observable and
significant" developmental changeS:
In this new conversation, we will use some current terminology to describe our
biological observations. Rather than using Aquinas' terms to talk about development,
i.e. animation, souls, and ensoulment; we will use these terms: human life, awareness,
and the process of developing awareness. Based upon our biological observations, we
will divide the first forty days of development into three stages. The stages are used to
show that an observable and significant change has taken place in the developing
embryo or fetus. As our criteria for what constitutes significant change may differ, our
delineation of the three stages may differ somewhat. Therefore, we outline these three
stages in a tentative way pending dialogue and conversation with others.2

He bases such division on current biological data:
In stage I we have human life. In this stage, the genetic code will guide the formation of
the cells that make up the embryonic body. These cells will differentiate themselves and
become specialized. Some cells will be designated to form the heart, while others will be
tapped to form the lungs and the brain. The process of conception is completed at around
fifteen days with implantation in the uterine wall. When implantation occurs, stage II
begins, which is individual human life. At forty days after Fertilization, Stage III begins,
individually aware human life. As early as forty, and definitely by sixty days after
fertilization, we can detect brain waves in the fetus. This is an important observation
because the presence of brain waves tells us that the brain is receiving sensory input. The
fetus now experiences awareness.)
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Defining stage I as "human life" and stage II as "individual human life" might
imply that there is no individual human life before implantation. This, however,
is not substantiated by current biological data.
II. Biological Data

We now know that at completed fertilization, the human embryo contains all the
genetic material necessary for development. We also know that, genetically,
fertilization involves the fusion of the fertilizing spennatozoon pronucleus with the
secondary oocyte pronucleus. Since these two pronuclei are haploid, we further
know that the resulting diploid zygotic nucleus constitutes a unique genome at the
biochemical level. Lastly, for our argument, we know that even the extranuclear
genetic material contained in intracellular organelles (such as mitochondria,
ribosomes, etc.) is also biochemically unique to each individual zygote. 4
Thus, provided the zygote is living and is the result of the fusion of a human spenn
with a human egg, one can conclude that the human zygote already qualifies as
individual human life. In fact, if observable and significant developmental change is
the operative criterion for differentiating between stages, then the first completed
zygotic mitosis is a much more significant event than implantation. Why? Because
first cleavage marks the true onset of differentitation, whereas during implantation
the blastocyst is well along the differentiation process. That is why the conventional
beginning stage II in (human) embryology is the first completed mitosis of the
individual zygote and not implantation. 5

m. Twinning
Twins originate from two fertilized eggs (dizygotic), or from a single fertilized egg
which undergoes complete or partial separation before implantation (monozygotic).
Since dizygotic twins develop from two genetically distinct zygotes, their
individuality from completed fertilization is not in question. Monozygotic twins, on
the other hand, develop from a single zygote, which means that they have almost
identical genomes.6 One must bear in mind, however, that even monozygotic twins
are true individuals, as evidenced by many living identical twins who lead nonnal,
healthy, individual lives. In the United States, monozygotic twins occur about once in
every 300 pregnancies. 7
The question arises; how can the zygote that generates monozygotic twins be
considered an individual? The answer to this question lies in the well established
natural occurence of asexual reproduction. In other words, it is entirely plausible for
an individual zygote to undergo total separation at first cleavage so as to result in two
new individual zygotes. Each one of these zygotes can then continue nonnal
development into two individual embryos. Alternatively, an individual zygote can
develop into an individual morula through nonnal mitosis. Subsequently, some
blastomeres fonning the morula fully separate before implantation, giving rise to two
distinct blastocysts. Each one of the blastocysts can then further develop into
individual embryos. At every stage of the aforesaid scenarios one observes
individuals: an individual zygote which generates another individual zygote; an
individual morula which generates another individual morula. If viable, all qualify as
individual human life.8
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IV. Dialogue
Simonds also mentions that: "In our current paradigm, conception is a process
lasting fifteen days. Therefore, moral questions during this period of time would
focus on the question of preventing conception rather than aborting an already
conceived embryo."9 This view of conception, however, stands in contrast with
the standard medical definition of fertilization: "The process beginning with
penetration of the secondary oocyte by the spermatozoon and completed by the
fusion of the male and female pronuc1ei."lo
If the process ural dimension of fertilization can be used to expand conception
until nidation of the blastocyst into the endometrium; why stop at implantation?
Consistency would demand that the entire gestation be seen as one continual
process, making conception coextensive with all nine months of human
pregnancy! In the final analysis, then, one realizes that Simonds' proposal is no
different from a proportionalist view of early embryonic life which attributes to
the human embryo incremental value as development occurs. I I
V. Conclusion
Recently, the National Institutes of Health has decided to federally fund
research and experimentation on early embryonic human life. 12 Also, the federal
government has decided to proceed with medical trials on the French
"contragestation" pill (RU486).13 Both these actions reflect the erroneous notion
that human embryonic life before implantation is somehow "less than" human,
and therefore available for research and disposal. Given the general confusion
regarding the status and value of early embryonic human life, it is imperative that
our contemporary language reflect our present knowledge on the subject: it can
now be stated that current biological observation corroborates the existence of
individual human life from completed fertilization. Therefore, the moral question
of experimenting and discarding embryonic human life before implantation,
focuses on abortion rather than on preventing conception.
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